The Dialogue on Democracy in Sri Lanka was held on the 13th of December, 2003 at the Marga Institute, Colombo. This reports consists of three parts: (i). A general introduction that provides the context in which the democracy debate took place in Sri Lanka, (ii). A report of the dialogue in the order of the interventions made, and (iii), A summary of the issues that were raised.

In Sri Lanka’s public conversation on democracy and democratization, there is at the moment an overwhelming reference to the ethnic conflict and its uncertain trajectories. The ethnic conflict continues to define the terms of the political debate as well as the agenda for change. Sri Lanka is also a society with certain political peculiarities that are intimately linked to its path of post-colonial democratization. Sri Lanka’s path of political change over its post-colonial phase has been a combination of two tracks – democratic-institutional and counter-state underground. The mainstream of political change has always been linked to formal institutions of democratic governance while the radical sub stream of political change has produced multiple rebellions and armed insurgencies. Sri Lanka is also a polity in which democracy is understood in competing and conflicting perspectives. For the nationalist political actors of the ethnic majority, democracy is primarily the rule of the majority while the minorities have been seeking a non-majoritarian re-thinking of democracy. These two perspectives of what democracy should mean have not been able to engage in a constructive dialogue.
Sri Lanka’s process of political change is at the crossroads. The futures of Sri Lanka’s democracy are intimately linked to the capacity or incapacity of the island’s key political actors to resolve the ethnic conflict through negotiation and state reform. The dialogue has brought into focus some of the immediate issues that concern Sri Lanka’s present political impasse and the possible ways out from it.

(i). Ethnic Conflict, Peace and State Reforms
The broad context, in which issues of democracy in Sri Lanka find meaning, has been primarily characterized by the ethnic conflict and attempts towards a negotiated end to the civil war. The protracted ethnic conflict, that had produced a civil war in the early 1980s, represents one of the key paradoxes of political change in post-colonial Sri Lanka. In the nation-building process, there has been a systematic exclusion, or marginalization, of ethnic minorities by the political leadership of the majority Sinhalese community. This majoritarian project of nation and state building also unfolded within a broadly liberal-democratic institutional framework characterized by a fairly ‘well-functioning’ democratic process. A key paradox of Sri Lanka’s post-colonial democratization has been the slipping of the country into a protracted civil war while the institutions and practices of formal democracy had functioned with a high degree of popular participation in the political process, facilitated by a well-developed political party system.

The Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) began, with the aid of international facilitation, a negotiation process in 2002. Through these negotiations, paralleled with a cease-fire agreement, parties sought a mutually acceptable political settlement to the conflict. In a broad sense, a negotiated settlement to the ethnic conflict and a restoration of peace are of crucial importance for a constructive political change in Sri Lanka. Future trajectories of the island’s democratic transformation are also largely linked to the possibilities of a settlement. However, one of the major drawbacks in the present peace process is that it is not backed by a consensus among key political actors and stakeholders. In the absence of dialogue across all political formations, the conflict settlement process may run the risk of suffering reversals.

Nevertheless, efforts towards a negotiated settlement to Sri Lanka’s conflict have also given rise to possibilities for reforming the constitutional and structural bases of the existing state. The Tamils are seeking a constitutional package of extensive regional autonomy. A settlement package would have be strong enough, in terms of autonomy, to be a viable alternative to the separate state project. That necessitates a framework of state re-building in Sri Lanka along a federalist direction. This presupposes a radical democratization process in terms of how political power is organized and shared in Sri Lanka.

However, the challenges for such democratic state reforms in Sri Lanka are enormous. Primary among them is the absence of a political consensus in the Sri Lankan polity on the nature of the post-conflict constitutional framework. In the constitutional discourse in recent years, the idea of devolution figures quite prominently. Sri Lanka’s notion of devolution of power signifies a limited federalist framework imagined strictly in accordance with the Indian constitution. However, the Tamil nationalists’ insistence on an ‘acceptable’ political solution is based on an advanced federalist, or even post-federal, imagination. This deficit in the contending imaginations on the future political and constitutional shape of Sri Lanka constitutes an unresolved issue of crucial importance.

A related issue is the absence of a political dialogue among and across Sri Lanka’s main ethnic communities on the nature, shape and organization of the post-civil war state. While the Tamils demand a territorialized regime of extensive regional autonomy covering the island’s Northern and Eastern provinces, the Sinhalese and Muslim communities view the idea with both suspicion and fear. Many Sinhalese political forces have portrayed both federalism and territory-based power sharing as a ‘stepping stone to separation.’ There is a general apprehension in Sinhalese society that any deviation from the unitary model of the state would be detrimental to the territorial unity of the island.

Meanwhile, the Muslim community who constitute a significant share of the population in the Eastern province view the Tamil autonomy project with fear. Recent political mobilization in the Muslim society has been grounded on the idea that the Muslims constituted a separate nationality and therefore any constitutional arrangement between the Sinhalese and Tamil leaders should not be at the expense of Muslim aspirations for a form of territorialized regional autonomy. While the imaginations of the future political world among Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim communities are ethnicized, there has been a little or no constructive political conversation between them for a shared political future. Indeed, one of the problems of Sri Lanka’s present political debate is the inability of the political as well as intellectual elites of the main ethnic communities to initiate a process of shared political imagination.

This provides the context for another dimension of the paradox of political reforms in Sri Lanka: the temptation among the political elite to introduce reforms from above. Reforms from above, as Sri Lanka experienced in 1987 as well as in the mid-1990s, have a tendency to generate much resistance, jeopardizing the very reform program that the ruling elites want to promote. In 1987, when the government introduced a system of devolution through constitutional reform, as a reform from above, it triggered off an anti-state Sinhalese rebellion. When in 1995-2000, another government attempted to introduce constitutional reforms to enhance the existing regime of devolution of power, there was much resistance, spearheaded by Sinhalese nationalist forces. It appears that in the Sri Lankan polity, there is a strong resentment to reform, a kind of reform resistance that stands in the way towards greater democratization.

(ii). Peace, Democracy and De-militarization
The democracy agenda in Sri Lanka is closely linked to the peaceful resolution of the protracted ethnic conflict. It entails more than a settlement agreement between the main parties to the ethnic conflict. It also presupposes de-militarization of the state as well as everyday life, and normalization of life conditions in the conflict areas. Indeed, the behind the façade of Sri Lanka’s political normalization are highly militarized structures and practices of the state, that have sprung up in the process of the civil war. Although the military check points in most of the cities have disappeared consequent to the cease-fire agreement, the so-called High Security Zones in Jaffna and other areas in the North which are under the government’s military control continue to affect the everyday life of the citizens in conflict areas. Large numbers of internally displaced families are still awaiting re-settlement while the re-building of the devastated economic and social infrastructure in the North and East is one of the essential priorities for peace and democracy. Similarly, there are thousands of families who have experienced psychosocial trauma during almost twenty years of intense war and violence in Sri Lanka’s Northeast as well as the South. Assistance for them to cope with trauma has been recognized, as a priority area of social and individual normalization after war, only recently. This issue is also liked to the re-integration with families and society of combatants, ex-combatants, child soldiers as well as the physically disabled. This human dimension of the de-militarization agenda offers a truly challenging task for the peace and democracy process.

(iii). New Political Institutions for North and East?
Meanwhile, the nature of the political institutions in the North and the East are in the transition from civil war to peace. This constitutes another key theme in Sri Lanka’s contemporary democracy debate. One reality in the North and East is that during the two decades of civil war, the presence of the Sri Lankan state there has been primarily in the form of a war machine. The institutions of governance in the Northern and Eastern provinces had been comprehensively replaced by institutions of war belonging to the Sri Lankan state as well as Tamil guerilla organizations. When the Sri Lankan state’s military institutions were withdrawn from certain areas of the North and East, the LTTE’s military institutions swiftly replaced them. Even after two years of peace negotiations and cease-fire, there are no new political institutions emerging in the North and East. The parallel state that has been set up by the LTTE in the areas under its control is essentially a military-administrative entity that also controls: with deadly efficiency, the economy, the market, political relations among the citizens and citizen groups and public life in general.

The political outcomes of the peace process in Sri Lanka are also largely measured in terms of political pluralism that a settlement should engender. At present, the space for pluralism in the North-East Tamil society is literally non-existent. The paradox that exists there, as often noted in Sri Lanka’s democracy debate, is whether democracy and pluralism could be imposed from outside, that is by the Sri Lankan state and the international community, or should the social conditions and space for democracy and pluralism be allowed to evolve through a process of engagement and reform with the LTTE. This paradox has actually divided Sri Lanka’s peace constituencies.
Indeed, there are now two approaches to the question of democratization and political institutions in the North and East. The first emphasizes conditional engagement with the LTTE. It is based on the argument that the Sri Lankan government and the international community should engage with the LTTE only on the condition that the LTTE reforms itself to allow pluralism, human rights, the rule of law and democracy. In the second approach, the emphasis is not on the conditionality, but on the transformative possibilities of constructive engagement with the LTTE by the Sri Lankan state, the international community and the democratic political actors in the local as well as global civil society.

Prof. Jayadeva Uyangoda (Social Scientists’ Association): Jayadeva Uyangoda welcomed the participants and explained briefly the purpose as well as the format of the dialogue. He began by saying that this dialogue was a part of a larger initiative in which the SSA (Social Scientists’ Association) is engaged in collaboration with the Center for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) in Delhi and the International-IDEA in Stockholm on the project ‘The State of Democracy in South Asia’. He said, “This study and dialogue is being carried out in India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal as well. It seeks to engage in a thorough qualitative ‘assessment’ of democracy in the five South Asian countries. The project has five components. They are: cross-section surveys, elite surveys, case studies, dialogues and qualitative assessment. These five components would employ different methodologies, but operate within the same intellectual framework”.

“At this national dialogue, our primary objective is to enable the participants to engage in a critical reflection on the promise, expectations, dynamics, institutions, limitations as well as future possibilities of democracy in Sri Lanka from perspectives that they have been working on. Such perspectives can very well be emanating from dimensions of class, ethnicity, gender, generational, private vs. public, institutional, and emancipatory”. Prof. Uyangoda noted that such a critical engagement with the theory and practice of democracy in Sri Lanka would directly contribute to shaping the overall study. The following is a note provided a framework for the intended discussion:

At the Dialogue, the participants were invited to engage in a focused presentation and exchange of ideas and debate on the experience of democracy in Sri Lanka in a framework constituted by the following four themes:

•	The Promise of Democracy: Under this theme, we may reflect on questions like the following: What has been the promise of democracy in Sri Lanka? How different social and ethnic groups, women, the labor movement and other stakeholders related themselves to the promise of democracy? What are the main sources that contributed to shaping the meaning of Democracy in Sri Lanka? What constitutes a common ground for democracy in a context of competing expectations? What are the main themes of contestation? What has been the democracy’s promise of transformation and emancipation?
•	Institutions and Design of Democracy: This theme can focus on institutional designs and processes that accompanied democracy. Its components are socio-economic structure, institutional arrangements, citizenship and rights, elections, parties and representation, and democratization. The discussion can focus on a critical review of the institutions and processes of democracy as evolved in Sri Lanka in its colonial and post-colonial phases.
•	Working and Outcomes: Under this theme, we can ask questions like: What has been the overall outcome of the democratic experience in Sri Lanka? To what extent has discrimination based on religion, caste, ethnicity, sex, class etc have been remedied or reduced? How far has there been equitable access to and redistribution of public resources. To what extent do democratic institutions (for example, the legislature and other elected assemblies) represent diverse social, ethnic and gender composition of society? What is the level of public confidence on the democratic institutions and processes including the rule of law and the judiciary? Has political participation itself been democratized? How has democracy negotiated with ethnic and social violence, war and crisis of governance?
•	Democracy’s Future: Given a backdrop of intense contestation, expectations and disappointments, we can ask some searching questions about the future promise of democracy in Sri Lanka. For example: Does democracy have any thing new to offer in Sri Lanka, which is trying to emerge out of a deep-rooted crisis? Should democracy reform itself if it were to be meaningful to Sri Lanka’s transition from civil war? Should there be some re-envisioning of the promise, institutions as well as practices of democracy?

Prof. Peter R deSouza (Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), Delhi): Prof. deSouza further explained the objectives of the dialogue workshop. He pointed out that this dialogue was a conversation among different knowledge universes on democracy. He cited some of the ideas that had emerged in the Bangalore, India dialogue, “In the city expansion process in Bangalore, the marginal social groups have no say at all in urban planning. It is a monopoly of the elite groups. The ‘Beautification of the city’ project is now closing up many open spaces to which everybody had free access”.

Ms. Sakuntala Kadirgamar-Rajasingham (International-IDEA, Stockholm): she explained the origin of this initiative and the role of the International-IDEA. She pointed out that in other dialogues held in South Asia under this initiative, specific themes have emerged.

The Dialogue combined the four themes mentioned in the above note into two sessions. Session I combined the two themes “Promise and Design of Democracy in Sri Lanka”. In Session II, the theme “Democracy’s Workings and Futures” was discussed.

Session I

Prof. Peter R deSouza (Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), Delhi): Opening the discussion in Session I, Prof. deSouza pointed out how, for example, the diversity of ethnic groups in society was a major challenge concerning the promise as well as the design of democracy in Nepal. In the Banglaore dialogue, the marginalization of Dalit communities was a recurring theme. “There are indeed alternative forms of thinking on democracy outside the liberal, institutional conceptualization. That new thinking often emerges through the political practices of communities who have been excluded from the hegemonic institutions of democracy”.

“Militarization of societies in South Asia is a major parallel process. Security check points that dot cities as well as the countryside are also points of interrogation of democracy”.

Ms. Sakuntala Kadirgamar-Rajasingham (International-IDEA, Stockholm): pointed out that in some instances, the marginality of social groups was used to deny them rights, arising from marginality itself. “A regular response to Dalit demands for rights and justice takes the form of saying ‘Enough has already been given. What more to give?’”

Dr. Sunil Bastian (International Center for Ethnic Studies): said that people initially saw democracy not only from an institutional or rule of law perspective, but also from the perspectives of poverty and equality. Sunil further said that democracy was believed to break up traditional identities and mediate among identity differences. “Sri Lanka’s present debate on democracy is dominated by concerns for institutional designing. The debate on the ethnic conflict resolution, for example, is primarily on designing new constitutional models”.

Mr. Tyrol Ferdinandes (Initiative for Conflict Transformation): joining the discussion argued that Sri Lanka’s current dilemma concerning democracy was related to three contextual issues. He said, “Firstly, Sri Lanka still is a ‘feudal society’ with democratic institutions. Democratic politics functions through patron-client networks and relationships. Secondly, democracy exists within a consumerist sub-culture amidst widespread poverty. Thirdly, there has been a series of armed struggles associated with political projects of group rights. Institutionalized liberal democracy might have guaranteed individual rights through a regime of constitutionalism and the rule of law, but not group rights”.

Tyrol also made the point that when democracy was ‘introduced’ to societies like Sri Lanka, it was seen as linked to a global civilizing project. It was presented as an “end product”, with no process value. There was no utility value attached to it at the local level. He said, “Meanwhile, in Sri Lanka’s North and East, where there has been a secessionist civil war for two decades, an attempt is being made to ‘introduce’ democracy without a contextual experience that can make democracy meaningful to people there in their local and everyday life”.

Mr. Marshal Fernando (Ecumenical Institute for Study and Dialogue): Marshal Fernando observed that the family and dynastic domination was a key characteristic in Sri Lanka’s democratic, party politics. He argued that there has been a feudal character to the political leadership. “Demcoratizing political leadership should be in a democratization agenda”.

Sarveswarama (Sarves – University of Colombo): also focused on the theme of ‘feudal’ and family-centric nature of democratic political leadership and the practices of leadership succession.

Ms. Vishaka Dharmadasa (Association of the War Widowed Women): pointed out that democracy was always defined by the majority and that in Sri Lanka, political democracy has had an inherently majoritarian character. Similarly, in conversations on democracy, class discrimination was never highlighted.

Dr. Jehan Perera (National Peace Council): joined the discussion on political leadership and commented, “Sri Lanka’s present political crisis is also linked to the leadership crisis. Sri Lanka’s two main political leaders, the President and the Prime Minister, are key to the resolution of the conflict, which in turn is central to the democratization process. Although the majority of the people want a resolution to the conflict, the two leaders are caught up in a power struggle, motivated by political self-interest”.

Dr. Ms. Jani de Silva (Independent Researcher): argued that there have been two discourses of democracy in Sri Lanka. “The first is the initiative of the marginal groups who pressed for democracy in the 1920s and 1930s. The second is the elite discourse of democracy”. She argued that Sri Lanka’s problem of democracy was not one of its leaders being evil, but it was a particular dynamic created by the elite hold of political power.

Nirmalan Karthikeyan (National Peace Council and UNDP): asked the question, “what has democracy meant to different communities? Different groups of people have experienced democracy in different ways and there is no one single experience of democracy”. He also posed the question of the role of religion in making democracy linked to the local socio-cultural contexts. “Is democracy a Western input? Is it alien to our cultures and traditions?”

Prof. Peter R deSouza (Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), Delhi): Peter at this moment intervened to say that the issue whether democracy has been alien or imported had repeatedly come up in the debates on democracy in India too. He said, “However, one paradox in Indian democracy is that the highest electoral participation there (in India) is among the social groups who are to benefit the least from democracy. An interesting question that can be raised in this context is: Hasn’t democratic practice been domesticated? A related question is: How do we grapple with the issue of democracy’s exclusion, for example in class and ethnic terms? Similarly, another paradox concerning the promise and design of democracy is that what have democratic institutions, for instance, universal franchise, done to the people – marginal communities – who fought for it?”

Dr. Sunil Bastian (International Center for Ethnic Studies): Sunil Bastian at this point intervened to say that in Sri Lanka, in the 1920s and the 1930s, marginal groups seized universal franchise and democracy for their emancipatory goals. At the same time, the experience of democracy has been the growing popular cynicism about franchise and democracy in general. He pointed out that patronage politics, which a number of speakers highlighted, has also been a consequence of the way in which democratic practices took an indigenous character. For many marginal social groups, political patronage provided a mechanism to receive public resources. Patronage politics, in Sunil’s argument, has been an important form of public resource transfer to the deprived and marginal social groups.

Sunil also drew attention to the link between violence and electoral politics. He pointed out that or electoral democracy to function, violence has become almost a pre-requisite in some contexts. Sunil suggested that some empirical case studies need to be undertaken to understand the complex dynamics of the relationship between political violence and electoral democracy.

Dr. Ms. Jani de Silva (Independent Researcher): intervened to say, “One problem that emerges when democracy travels is the relationship between democracy, religion and secularism”. She also pointed out that democratic patronage politics has now come to a crisis. “There is tension between political leaders who see the market as the mechanism for resource transfer and the people who continue to want patronage politics to stay as a form of public resource transfer”.

Devanesan Nesiah (Marga Institute): returning to the theme of ‘feudalism in democracy’ said that political parties based on the community and religion are often seen as illegitimate and inappropriate to democracy. She said, “However, we need to recognize the crucial importance of group identity – caste and religious loyalties – for democratic political mobilization”.

M. I. M. Mohideen (Muslim Rights Organization): intervened to say that democracy in Sri Lanka has had a strongly majoritarian bias. It has been a democracy to the majority with minority discrimination. In that majoritarian democratic process, the safeguards for minority protection have been systematically removed. In public policy too, there have been attempts at majority domination in minority regions. Land colonization policy is one key example. Mohideen argued that the democratic process needed to be re-considered. He pointed out how there have been systematic violations of Muslim rights in Sri Lanka’s Eastern province during the recent peace process. He also pointed out that the critique of Sri Lanka’s majoritarian democracy has been mainly from the perspective of the Tamil community. Mohideen argued that the Muslim community’s rights have been violated by the Sinhalese majority as well as the regional majority of Tamils.

Dr. Marcus Meyer (University of Colombo): asked about democracy’s arrival, “To whom has it arrived?” Bringing to the discussion the youth perspectives on democracy, he said that a recent National Youth Survey has revealed a growing sense of alienation and discrimination among the Sri Lankan youth. He said that increasing violence may be linked to this alienation and suggested the in - depth, qualitative case studies might shed more light on this issue. Marcus also suggested, “We need to look for local level processes of empowerment, particularly the youth, in the democratic system”.

Mr. Kumar Rupesinghe (Foundation for Co-existence): described how Sri Lanka’s democracy has totally excluded the minorities from the sphere of state power. “The minorities have been treated as second-class citizens. Although there are now proposals for a federal solution to Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict”. Kumar asked whether a Sinhalese hegemonic state could transform itself into a federal state. He noted that the Sri Lankan state has been an excessively centralized one and that the political elite are not exited at all about a future federal state. Kumar Rupesinghe argues that the future of Sri Lanka’s impinges on the resolution of the ethnic conflict but asked whether the present political leadership has the capacity to undertake that task. The class character as well as the quality of the political leadership is such that the political leadership does not seem to be up to that historical task.

Kumar also noted the absence of a citizens’ movement for peace and democracy. “An autonomous civil society movement that can put pressure on the political parties is necessary”.

Mr. M. Sambandan (Hindu Correspondent in Colombo): raising the question, “Has democracy arrived or not?” he answered, “Both ‘yes’ and ‘no.’ In South Asia, democracy has had its social leveling effect. It has led to local empowerment. Democracy has also arrived in the sense of ensuring representation to the previously unrepresented communities. Democracy has not arrived in the economic and developmentalist sense”. Sambandan warned that the non-arrival of democracy was a fascination for non-democracy and a romance for hegemony as well as quick results. “When we talk about the arrival or non-arrival of democracy, we need to ask what is the unit of democracy we are looking at – class, caste, group or the individual”.

Mr. Harinda Vidanage (Student, University of Colombo): pointed out that the society is divided both vertically and horizontally, and that democracy functions while negotiating these divisions. He drew attention to the emerging religious tension between the Buddhist and Christian communities in Moratuwa, a multi-religious suburb of Colombo. He noted that within the promise of democracy has been a secret culture, associated with caste and family.

Mr. Dilhan Fernando (Student, University of Colombo and National Peace Council): Argued that often democracy is seen as having been superimposed on the people. Democracy’s politics of exclusion has contributed to this perception. He also argued that the arrival of democracy has occurred through social and other hierarchies.

Ms. Vishaka Dharmadasa (Association of the War Widowed Women): intervened at this stage to suggest that the political parties have developed a tendency to disregard people and that the people have been largely alienated from the party leadership. She also asked, “Why is it that the people are not mobilized by political parties in protest demonstrations when the people’s rights are threatened?”

Dr. Jehan Perera (National Peace Council): intervened at this point to argue that the strength of democracy cannot be measured by the number of people demonstrating on the streets. He suggested that the absence of people on the streets in protest in Sri Lanka was largely due to cultural reasons. Democratic political participation, according to Jehan, was culture-based.

Dr. Sunil Bastian (International Center for Ethnic Studies): joined the discussion by saying that there was no ‘ideal’ system of democracy as such, although there may be shared normative yardsticks. He also said that the political party system has deeply penetrated the Sri Lankan society. Although people were some times cynical about the party system, it has also achieved certain important things. He said, “In assessing the performance of democracy, it is important to understand these dynamics”. Sunil suggested that a sociological study of the political party system would be very useful.

Prof. Peter R deSouza (Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), Delhi): He brought the theme of secularism back to the discussion. He asked, “What would have happened, if the secular constitutive principle were not there? Should we abandon it?” He also said that it would be important to examine whether secularism was the only way to design democratic institutions. Drawing attention to a similar paradox, Prof. deSouza commented that the NGOs could also be seen as an impediment to democracy.

Mr. Kumar Rupesinghe (Foundation for Co-existence): Kumar at this stage brought to the discussion the theme of Sri Lanka’s political class. He observed, “Sri Lanka’s political class at present has become incapable of designing a political agenda in order to take forward the reform process through peace and constitutional reform”. He said that the external forces have begun to make decisions for Sri Lanka’s ruling class. He suggested that the weakness of Sri Lanka’s political class was its class character, a trading class that fails to see its long-term class interests. Kumar also raised the question as to why there was no social movement in Sri Lanka for democracy and peace. He said that the NGOs are not linked to any social movement as such.

Kumar also highlighted the question of violence in social and family relations that seemed to be on the rise. He said that violence against women and alcoholism is particularly pervasive among the poor and the plantation workers. He suggested that the question of democracy and violence within the family needs to be explored.

Mr. M. Sambandan (Hindu Correspondent in Colombo): intervened in the discussion to defend the idea of secularism. He warned of abandoning the principle of secularism, in favor of national cultures etc. Sambandan expressed the view that the advances made by South Asian societies in relation to democracy are largely due to the democracy’s secularism. In the future too, the only hope for positive political change is in a secular democracy.

Dr. Ms. Jani de Silva (Independent Researcher): intervened to point out the complexities of the democracy-secularism link. As Jani argued, in South Asia, democracy arrived in a very diverse society, characterized by competing loyalties along caste, tribal, group and religious identities whereas the idea of a secular democracy assumes, as in Anglo-Saxon societies, a measure of social homogeneity. She also said that democracy cannot come to terms with political violence and therefore the discourse of democracy tends to criminalize social and political violence. This according to Jani was one of the problems in the idiom of democracy that we employ.

Mr. Marshal Fernando (Ecumenical Institute for Study and Dialogue): at this point suggested that the reason why we had gone wrong in democracy is elite mismanagement of it. On the question of religion and democracy, he said that working with Buddhist monks was extremely important. In his view, many Buddhist monks felt that they had been excluded from the democratic process.

Devanesan Nesiah (Marga Institute): continued with the theme of secularism and democracy, by drawing the attention to the equality principle that enabled marginal social and ethnic groups to have access to public goods.

Mr. Jagath Senaratne (International Center for Ethnic Studies): made his intervention suggesting that in a discussion on the experience of democracy in Sri Lanka, “We need to consider the Sinhalese sense of exclusion, or their feeling of being excluded. There is a deep sense of deprivation and discrimination during the colonial rule among the Sinhalese and the way in which the Sinhalese nationalism related itself to democracy is largely shaped by this feeling of exclusion. Similarly, it is important to ask the question: How the grievances of the ethnic majority, who dominate the polity, can be addressed within the democratic political system?” For a proper understanding of democracy in Sri Lanka, Jagath argued, it was important to find out what the Sinhalese-Buddhist majority sees as democracy. “Similarly, we must get a sense of what are the core beliefs of the Sinhalese masses about democracy. How do they see the role of the minorities in the polity”.

Session II

The discussion on secularism continued in the post-lunch session as well.

Mr. M. Sambandan (Hindu Correspondent in Colombo): Sambandan made the point that a clear distinction should be made between how political formations look at things and how the state should do so. He said, “Although political parties and groups may see politics from a religious perspective, the state should not”.

Dr. Sunil Bastian (International Center for Ethnic Studies): Sunil Bastian at this stage shifted the focus of discussion from secularism to development. He suggested, “The democratic process has also negotiated with regional equalities, uneven development and development policies. However, in designing development policies, although political leaders have attempted to various social demands, the actual policies have been shaped by policy consultants and bureaucracies and not necessarily by people’s representatives”. He also pointed out that at present there were three factors of production being brought under the market forces – land, labor and water. It would be useful to see how these changes affect the electorate and the democratic process.

Mr. Jagath Senaratne (International Center for Ethnic Studies): Jahath at this point returned to the discussion on feudalism, questioning the assertion that the Sri Lankan was feudal. He said that new attitudes are emerging in society that were far from being feudal.

Mr. Harinda Vidanage (Student, University of Colombo): Harinda in response to Jagath shifted the discussion to the theme of media and democracy. He asked whether the media in Sri Lanka had been used at all in the democratization project. “The media”, as Harinda pointed out, “is owned either by a few families or by the state”.

Prof. Peter R deSouza (Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), Delhi): Peter intervened to make the following two points, “(i). There seems to be two constructions of the state in Sri Lanka today. The first says that the political class is unwilling to reform the state. The other suggests that the international forces are set to down-size the state. The question then is: how to reconcile these two? (ii). The role and place of civil society in the democratization process needs to be carefully explored”.

Mr. M. Sambandan (Hindu Correspondent in Colombo): Sambandan joined the discussion at this stage arguing that the relationship between the state and civil society was important for democracy. “States”, he said, “get democracies they deserve”.

Prof. Jayadeva Uyangoda (Social Scientists’ Association): intervened to say that the relationship between civil society and political change has been a complex one. “In the mid-twentieth century, it was the civil society that had led the process for political change in Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka, the capacity of the political leadership for radical change has always been limited. In the present context in Sri Lanka, the decline of the Left movement and the working class politics has made the role of the civil society for political change much more important than it was a few decades ago. However, the civil society should not be seen as a substitute for Left-wing parties. Many civil society groups are single-issue oriented and they lack broad perspectives or agendas”.

Ms. Sakuntala Kadirgamar-Rajasingham (International-IDEA, Stockholm): at this point said that the civil society in Sri Lanka was ethnically segmented as Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim. Responding to the point that the political leaders are not capable of reforms, Saku asked whether violence was once again the instrument for change?

Mr. M. Sambandan (Hindu Correspondent in Colombo): pointed out that civil society and public discourse have a complex relationship and that it is not always a directly positive one. “For example, public discourse on federalism in Sri Lanka has entrenched hostile attitudes to federalism. In the political moment of 1993-1994, Sri Lankan civil society had a crucial role to play but the civil society could not consolidate its leadership position”. Sambandan also pointed out that after independence in 1948, Sri Lanka has had a ‘nation-breaking’ political process, rather than a nation-building one.

Mr. Jagath Senaratne (International Center for Ethnic Studies): Jagath explaining why the Sri Lankan civil society movement could not make a significant intervention after 1993-1994. He said that partly it was due to the fact that most of the civil society groups were linked to the People’s Alliance, which came to power in 1994. “When civil society groups work with political parties”, Jagath argued, “they would lose their autonomy as well as their independent political role”. He also suggested that mass movements in Sri Lanka have existed only for short durations. Those who were active today are social action groups and research NGOs.

Prof. Peter R deSouza (Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), Delhi): Peter at this point suggested that the relationship between social movements and NGOs needed to be mapped. He asked, “A question that needs to be explored in this regard is: Has the growth of the NGOs blunted the growth of social movements?”

Prof. Jayadeva Uyangoda (Social Scientists’ Association): Prof. Uyangoda said, “The question of the militarization of the state is equally important. The democratic reform agenda has not really considered de-militarization of the state as an important goal. Those formal as well as informal institutions of extreme violence have not yet been dissolved. De-militarization is intimately linked to the futures of democracy”.

Mr. Marshal Fernando (Ecumenical Institute for Study and Dialogue): Marshal brought to attention the question of law and order and the criminalization of society as new challenges to the democratization process.

Mr. Selvin Iranius (Sub-Committee on the Immediate Rehabilitation and Humanitarian Needs (SIRHN), Kilinochchi): began his intervention by pointing out, “In Sri Lanka’s North and East, where there has been a Tamil separatist insurgency, the political process has been quite autonomous of the South. From the Tamil minority perspective, democracy has always enabled to entrench the majority ruling? For the minorities, democracy has been trick played on them by the majority’s political leaders. Democracy as practiced in Sri Lanka has done a lot of damage to minorities”.

Mr. M. Sambandan (Hindu Correspondent in Colombo): Sambandan in this context brought to the discussion the role of the judiciary in checking the state. The experience in Sri Lanka of the minorities had been that the judiciary has failed to check the majoritarian excesses of the state.

Sarveswarama (Sarves – University of Colombo): Sarveswaran pointed out that often the civil society institutions themselves do not practice democracy. He cited the example of trade unions.

Mr. Dilhan Fernando (Student, University of Colombo and National Peace Council): brought to the attention the low level of women’s representation in democratic institutions. He also said that the minorities have note been adequately represented.

Devanesan Nesiah (Marga Institute): at this point made the observation that Tamilians in Sri Lanka during the past eighty years had not been with the governing system. As he suggested, “The question is more than the lack of representation. It is about a political order that has evolved without the minorities in it”.

Ms. Vishaka Dharmadasa (Association of the War Widowed Women): On the question of the absence of democracy in civil society institutions, Vishaka made the point that the lack of democracy within the media organization is a major stumbling block. She said, “The media is often nationalist and they seldom report the violations faced by the minorities or disempowered groups”. She said that she had attempted to get media coverage on the missing persons during the war, but the media was not very responsive.

Ms. Sakuntala Kadirgamar-Rajasingham (International-IDEA, Stockholm): at this point Sakuntala observed that the media in Sri Lanka had often maintained an ethnic bias in reporting. This has been the case in Sinhalese, English as well as the Tamil press. She pointed out that the media had also contributed to a culture of violence.

Mr. M. Sambandan (Hindu Correspondent in Colombo): Sambandan reiterated that the relationship between the judiciary and democracy should be explored. About Sri Lanka’s power-sharing system of provincial councils, Sambandan observed that they were working where they are not wanted, and that they were not allowed to function where they are wanted.

Prof. Jayadeva Uyangoda (Social Scientists’ Association): Prof. Uyangoda joined the discussion on the role of the judiciary in Sri Lanka by observing that the judiciary had been a conservative institution with regard to minority rights. The judiciary’s sensitivity to human rights was also a recent development.

Mr. Harinda Vidanage (Student, University of Colombo): He pointed out that the position of the Member of Parliament (MP) has over the years been strengthened vis a vis the citizen, making the MP’s position privileged. He suggested that for the legitimacy of the democratic process, this tension between the MP and the citizen needed to be resolved.

Mr. M. Sambandan (Hindu Correspondent in Colombo): Concerning the future democratic institutions for Sri Lanka, Sambandan suggested the relevance of a Second Chamber as an institutional devise for checks and balances.

Devanesan Nesiah (Marga Institute): Devanesan joined the discussion on institutional devises by pointing out that Professor Yohan Galtung had suggested a Second Chamber at the national level for Sri Lanka, with equal number of members for every community. Professor Galtung had also proposed second chambers at the regional level, with representation for all regional ethnic groups. Devanesan’s point was that the second chambers at the national as well as regional levels would enable power equilibrium among ethnic groups.

Ms. Sakuntala Kadirgamar-Rajasingham (International-IDEA, Stockholm): at this stage Sakuntala pointed out that in Sri Lanka there seemed to be different discourses on constitutional futures in different communities. So far there had not been much conversation among these discourses. She suggested that there should be a dialogue among them.

Mr. David Goldstein (National Peace Council): He suggested that university students, law students and young lawyers should be encouraged to develop their own constitutional proposals to strengthen the democratic process.

Mr. Marshal Fernando (Ecumenical Institute for Study and Dialogue): observing how there is authoritarianism in public institutions, he suggested that democracy should be included in all educational processes.

Prof. Peter R deSouza (Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), Delhi): Peter responded by saying, “In Sri Lanka, there is a need for a new imagination for a fresh configuration OF political institutions IN which all communities can equally share”. He said that he had observed during the dialogue a deep anguish that requires a creative political process like in South Africa. He had also noticed a sense of loss, fatalism, despair and a concern about de-politicization. The challenge was how to rise above and transcend these empirical realities.

The following were issues that the dialogue brought into focus:

•	Majoritarianism that shaped the democratic experience and the exclusion of ethnic minorities from the spheres of governance, representation.
•	Inadequacies of institutional designing that often excluded the marginalized social and ethnic groups who looked up to institutions of democracy for advancement and emancipation.
•	The limitation of Sri Lanka’s civil society to function as an effective mediatory agency between the state and the citizen. The civil society politics should be autonomous and independent from regime agendas. The failure of civil society groups to maintain such political autonomy would undermine the legitimacy of civil society interventions.
•	The limited capacity of the Sri Lankan ruling elites to resolve Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict in a decisive and constructive manner.
•	The future trajectories of Sri Lanka’s democracy are closely linked to the resolution of the ethnic conflict.
•	Some of the absences of democracy in Sri Lanka may be linked to the specific nature of Sri Lankan society in which pre-capitalist social relations continue to exist.
•	Democratization itself has given rise to patron-client linkages between political institutions and citizens.
•	There has been a disjuncture between development and social justice issues. The patron-client relationship between political institutions and citizens may be seen as a corrective mechanism of that deficit in democratic governance.
•	Peace negotiations and a political settlement to the ethnic conflict will offer a historic opportunity for the Sri Lankan people to imagine a new political architecture of democratic governance.