Bangladesh (former East Pakistan) proved the alliance of forces comprising of the military, bureaucratic, feudal, clergy and business elites of West Pakistan against the Bengali population of East Pakistan whose leadership primarily comprised of secular and middle class background.
The post-1971 Pakistan, consisting of its Western wing witnessed the further strengthening of anti-democratic forces. The assumption of power by Mr. Z. A. Bhutto in the remaining parts of Pakistan on December 20, 1971 had raised some expectations for democracy and the reduction of the military-bureaucratic influence in governance. Bhutto’s mode of governance was criticized as authoritarian because he expressed least tolerance vis-à-vis his political opponents. Curbs on press, opposition political parties and other coercive measures used by him to silence opposition made a mockery of democracy during his rule. While Bhutto did try to strengthen civilian control over state apparatus, he too faced numerous limitations particularly because of the reassertion of the military after recovering from its 1971 debacle, the growing influence of the clergy in the aftermath of declaring Ahmadis as non-Muslims in 1974 and the movement against him which was launched from March-June 1977. The coalition of forces which operated against Bhutto represented partly the modern elite and partly representing the military. The business community, a section of the bureaucracy, the military and the clergy considered Bhutto’s rule either as too liberal or similar to a civilian dictatorship. It was during the military and quasi-military rule of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) that for the first time in Pakistan’s history, there occurred an alliance composed of the military and the clergy opposing democracy. The purpose of that nexus was to prevent the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) led by former Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto’s daughter, Benazir Bhutto from coming to power. She was considered as a secular, progressive and democratic leader and her coming to power would have hit the interests of military and their partners in the clergy. Therefore, the mullah-military alliance (MMA) during Zia days ‘provided legitimacy to military rule, which justified its suppression of democratic forces by claiming to be building an Islamic order. The alliance between Islamism and military rule produced stability, but was ultimately fraught with too many inconsistencies and divergent interests of its key actors to survive. The end of the Zia period in 1988 also ended the formal alliance between Islamists and the State.’ Similar views about the military-mullah alliance were echoed by Pakistan’s leading journalist, Zaffar Abbas as: ‘Pakistan’s so-called military-mullah alliance came into existence during the reign of former military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq, who used the Islamists as the bulwark of the army’s domestic and regional policy objectives. General Zia, himself a conservative Muslim openly supported and nurtured various Islamic groups to counter the mainstream political parties opposed to his rule.’ Although his process of ‘Islamisation’ made sure that the ruling elite composed of the military, the bureaucracy and the corporate sector block the democratic forces from coming to power, he also got open support from some Islamic parties in this regard.
The question that arises is: how can one identify Islamists in the Pakistan army? Khaled Ahmed, a renowned political analyst of Pakistan argues that, ‘it is difficult to identify the faces that represent the Islamist domination of the army. But it is easy to see their spokesmen outside the army. A number of select retired army generals and ulema express the opinion of ORs (other ranks) by being usually defiant in their statements. Generals Hamid Gul and Javed Nisar are typical examples of the out-of-job Islamist Generals who wield a clout despite the fact that they are retired. Both pronounce themselves on foreign policy, particularly Kashmir, Afghanistan and the United States, as these themes relate directly to the internal situation in Pakistan. While General Javed Nasir represents the Deobandi segment of militant Islam, General Hamid Gul sits atop the general Islamist consensus of the Jihadi militants.’ As rightly stated by a Pakistani political analyst,
‘General Zia-ul-Haq’s military government (1977-1985) pampered the Islamic parties and encouraged the orthodox and fundamentalist groups to enter politics in order to undercut the support of his political adversaries. The Jamaat-i-Islami either openly supported General Zia-ul-Haq or maintained a cooperative interaction with him until the withdrawal of martial law.’
Although Zia’s death and the assumption of power by Benazir raised hopes and expectations for a viable political process, the nexus between the clergy, the military and the bureaucracy continued resulting in the derailment of the political process.
From 1988 till 1999 during the two governments of Benazir and Nawaz Sharif, the role of the clergy in politics increased substantially because of their 11 years of patronage by the Zia regime, the emergence and rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the role of Islamic groups against the Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir. Musharraf’s regime since October 1999 saw the further strengthening of compatibility between the traditional and modern elite with the sole aim of preventing democratic forces from coming to power. Opportunism expressed by the clergy in dealing with vital national issues like poverty, underdevelopment, exploitation of the masses and the absence of a viable democratic process proved the lack of interest on the part of a majority of religious parties and groups to speak for the rights of the people. For that reason, ‘time and again, the religious political parties in Pakistan have proven that their commitment is to an abstruse Islam, relevant to the interest of the ruling elite of this country, but not to its people. They have exhibited a blatant disregard for the rich culture and history of what is modern day Pakistan.’
This case study would look at the relationship between the traditional and modern elites in Pakistan and their overt and covert links with the clergy. Pakistan is one of the countries where the western style ruling elite which is primarily composed of the bureaucracy, the military and the corporate sector feel comfortable to forge an alliance with the clergy and various Islamic groups to keep the secular, progressive and democratic forces at bay and out of power. Some of the questions, which this case study will examine, are as follows: -
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Is there any historical basis for the nexus between the military, the bureaucracy, the clergy, and the corporate and feudal classes against a democratic political process and if yes then what are the reasons in this regard?
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Is there any linkage between the modern elite and Islamic groups in Pakistan? |
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What interests are shared by the military, the bureaucracy, the feudals, the clergy and the corporate sector and how the traditional and modern classes overcome their contradictions and why? |
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Why have the democratic forces not been able to effectively deal with the coalition and nexus of the military, the bureaucracy, the feudal, the clergy and the corporate sector against the establishment of a viable political process?
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Historical Basis of the Nexus
The modern elite in Pakistan is composed of those segments of society that wield considerable power in the military, bureaucratic, economic and political areas. The upper hand in the modern elite is of the military and the bureaucracy because of their influence and involvement in the mode of governance since the formative phase of Pakistan. To some extent, the upper class, and the feudal and landed aristocracy are also included in the structure of that elite. The modern elite of Pakistan is not progressive in its mindset. Despite its modern appearance, it wants to maintain political status quo so as to prevent the process of social change in the country to get an access to power. Democratic forces are a weak component of the modern elite and to a large extent are almost excluded from its parameters. The clergy in Pakistan is composed of religious elements that control mosques, madrassas and other religious institutions. Because of a cogent role of religion in Pakistani society, the clergy plays a very important role in the country’s politics. Islamic movements are composed of groups who want to introduce an Islamic system in the country and for that purpose they have organized themselves into political parties.
The marginalization of democratic forces in the formative phase of Pakistan resulted in the emergence of a nexus between the military and the bureaucracy. Pakistan’s founding father Mohammad Ali Jinnah died on September 11, 1948 and the country’s first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated on October 16, 1951. Intrigues and manipulation against democracy got an impetus when political leaders failed to formulate a constitution and take a united stand on major issues like the role of religion, provincial autonomy, the mode of government, whether presidential or parliamentary and so forth. The growing schism between East and West Pakistan also contributed to the fragility of political process which was exploited by the bureaucracy and the military. Along with these two emerging pillars of power, the feudal elite and the clergy also joined hands to conspire against democracy.
Four important reasons which resulted in the emergence and strengthening of the nexus between the military, bureaucratic and feudal elite along with a segment of clergy against the democracy are as follows:
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The fear among the West Pakistani ruling elite from the Bengali majority population of the then East Pakistan. In a democratic set-up, the Bengalis would have controlled the reins of government which the coalition of the military, the bureaucracy, the feudals and the clergy from the then West Pakistan didn’t want at all. Therefore, sometimes, under the name of national unity, religion, and law and order, they did everything to keep the Bengalis out of power. When it was evident during the mid-1950s that despite establishing parity between the Western and Eastern wings of Pakistan, it will not be possible to stop the Bengalis from coming to power, the ruling elites of West Pakistan decided to impose martial law which meant power would be in the hands of the West Pakistan dominated military. To a large extent, the nexus of the military, the bureaucracy, the feudal, the business and the clergy belonging to West Pakistan tried its level best to prevent democracy from taking root in Pakistan and when during the December 1970 general elections, the Awami League gained a majority, Islamabad refused to accept the election results and launched the ruthless military operation in the then East Pakistan. The outcome was the break-up of Pakistan and the emergence of a new dynamics of power in West Pakistan, the successor state of Pakistan. |
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Religion and its misuse by the power elites of Pakistan since the inception of that country was meant to exclude democratic process from governance and statecraft. It is true that religion is a binding force for the people of Pakistan, but the manner in which the military, the bureaucracy, the feudal, the business and the clergy manipulated it for their vested interest proved two things. First, they wanted to curb ethnic and nationalistic forces of Pakistan and second prevent democracy from taking root. Because of illiteracy, lack of political consciousness and backwardness of society, those who had conspired against democracy succeeded in their task. Even now, the nexus of all such groups against democracy is very much evident from the role of the religious alliance called Muthada Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) in providing tacit support to the military backed regime by fielding candidates against the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD). According to the ARD, the MMA is acting as a friendly opposition in the parliament and had it been committed to democracy it should have supported it for the restoration of democracy in the country. |
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The inability of secular and democratic forces in Pakistan to strengthen their position and counter the growing rise of religious movements and their alignment with the ruling circles of the country also strengthened the alliance against democracy. The movements for the restoration of democracy against military rulers like Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf couldn’t succeed in establishing a viable democracy because a strong segment of the religious elite sided with the military dictators. Although the Jamaat-e-Islami, which was and is considered to be the most organized religious political party of Pakistan opposed the authoritarian rule of Ayub Khan, it strongly supported the regime of Zia-ul-Haq. The military establishment, with the help of intelligence agencies was able to divide the Islamic groups so as to weaken movements for the restoration of democracy. Ostensibly, the MMA is opposing the regime of Pervez Musharraf but it has not taken any firm stance for an open confrontation with the military. The rift and division within democratic forces is also a cause of periodic intervention on the part of military. It is argued that a major reason which has led to the fragility of political parties with some commitment to democracy is the penetration of pro-establishment elements in their rank and file. Those who are at the helm of affairs have made sure that if there is a threat to their hold over power from political parties, such a threat will be neutralized by using the planted elements. The inability of the democratic political parties of Pakistan to cope with the agents of the establishment in their fold led to the strengthening of the nexus of the military, the bureaucracy, the feudal, the business and the clergy against the launching of a genuine political process in the country. |
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The impact of the Islamic revolution in Iran, the Jihad against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, the outbreak of the revolt against the Indian rule in its controlled parts of Jammu and Kashmir and the events unfolding as a result of the end of the cold war particularly America’s colossal support to Israel and its war against terrorism resulting in Washington’s attack over Afghanistan led to the realignment of religious forces in Pakistan. Given the fact that the presence of militant elements within the military’s rank and file also gave encouragement to religious groups in Pakistan, the emergence of Jihadi culture getting an impetus from the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan and resistance against the Indian control in Jammu and Kashmir proved one basic fact: democracy and political pluralism were a target of religious groups and their supporters in the military. For the ruling elites of Pakistan, bearing the Jihadi culture was a necessary evil till the time the events of September 11, 2001 forced the ruling establishment to keep some distance from those groups who were beneficial to them in Kashmir but were not in the good books of the West because of their alleged acts of terrorism.
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For the military and bureaucratic elite, Islamic movements were a lesser evil as compared to democratic forces because the former seldom questioned authoritarian and dictatorial rule while the latter wanted the non-civilian control over the mode of governance. Islamic movements in Pakistan have been more or less concerned with issues ranging from confining women to their homes, ban on alcohol, gambling, film and music but they were and are least interested in supporting democracy, human rights, rights of women, human development and modernization. Islamic movements were also not against the perks and privileges of the military and bureaucratic establishment and were co-opted by the former in the power structure of the country during the days of Zia’s martial law.
The role of the military-clergy nexus in Pakistan has been vividly examined by Vali Nasr, Professor of Middle Eastern and South Asian Studies at the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey in the following words: -
Over the course of the past three decades two issues have been central to Pakistan’s political development: first, democratization and civil-military relations, and, second, Islamization and Islamism’s relations to the state. The two issues have been separate and yet interdependent as they have unfolded in tandem to shape Pakistan’s politics. In the 1980s, Islamism supported the military’s drive for power and suppression of democratic forces. Since 1988, the military, the Islamist forces, and democratic parties have competed with one another jockeying for power and position in defining the rules of the game. The complexity of the integrators between the three actors during the decade of civilian rule (1988-99) precluded the institutionalization of democracy and facilitated the return of the military to power in 1999. The case of Pakistan is intrusive in what it reveals about the changing role of Islamism in determining the balance of power between civil-military relations, and how democratization and Islamization, civil-military and Islamism-state relations are influencing one another deciding how Pakistan’s politics will unfold from this point forward.
On these grounds, as compared to democratic political parties in Pakistan, the Islamic movements and the clergy served the interests of the ruling elite. Most important, the religious right in Pakistan has seldom taken a stand against martial law or the authoritarian form of government and the military establishment has used them in Afghanistan and in Kashmir. Things only began to change after the events of September 11 when the Jihadi groups, covertly supported by the military, came in the hit list of the United States. But it became a big problem for the Musharraf regime to detach itself from Jihadi elements who since long were serving military’s interest in Kashmir and in Afghanistan. Cracks in the nexus of the military establishment and Jihadi/extremist groups began to appear in the post-September 11 period but it doesn’t mean that the clergy or the religious groups tend to take a hostile position against the military. The reason for the submissive nature of the clergy while dealing with the military establishment is that over the years they have sought enormous benefits from the ‘men in khaki’ and they are not in a position to challenge those who were patronizing them.
The clergy in Pakistan is not like that in Iran which defied the power of the Shah of Iran and its military and launched a vigorous movement against the pro-American regime. On the contrary, the clergy in Pakistan is status quo-oriented and has mostly supported the military takeover and the Jihadi groups were promoted by the ruling elite for serving their political and strategic/security interests in Pakistan and neighboring countries. But the clergy, on account of its considerable power, which it has accumulated over the years, feels confident of playing its own role in the country’s politics. As said by Khaled Ahmed,
While it is time that Pakistan’s political crisis has emboldened the clergy to challenge the very foundation of the State, it can’t be ignored that the clerical point of view has undergone considerable change over years in general and in post-Afghan war period in particular. The cleric is no longer the sedentary man of God presiding over rituals and issuing verdicts that no one cares to enforce. He is a teacher as well as a warrior. He sometimes, calls himself ‘general’ and his party is called ‘Army.’ He is assertive in the expression of his opinion and aggressive in argument. The money coming from abroad and the anti-Western mood of the civil society, are factors behind his transformation and reassertion.
The Linkage
Is there a linkage between the modern elite of Pakistan and the Islamic movements? How has that linkage impacted the country’s political process and structure? As discussed earlier, there exists a historical basis of linkage between the military-bureaucratic establishment and the clergy. But, such a linkage had much to do with the political, security and geo-strategic realities of the cold war era. In order to cope with left-wing and socialist movements in the country, the pro-American regimes of Pakistan formed a common ground with right-wing religious groups. Despite maintaining a western lifestyle, those in power did not see a contradiction in co-opting conservative and orthodox Mullahs for dealing with a common threat. Even after the end of the cold war at the superpower level, one can see that the so-called alliance between the ruling elites of Pakistan and a segment of religious society of the country is still in tact. The only dent in that alliance occurred after the withdrawal of American support to the Jihadi forces in Afghanistan because of the Soviet military exit from that country. A wave of anti-Americanism swept the religious right of Pakistan following a chain of events namely the United States’ blatant support to Israel’s oppressive policy vis-à-vis the Palestinians, the presence of American forces in the Arabian Peninsula, American intervention in Afghanistan resulting in the ouster of the Taliban and the United States’ attack over Iraq. But the military establishment maintained its links with the religious right in order to use them against the Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir. It disowned the Taliban because of the events of September 11, 2001 but refused to withdraw its support to the Kashmiri resistance groups in the Indian-controlled parts of Jammu and Kashmir.
Four important bases of the linkage between the military-bureaucratic and other ruling elites of Pakistan and the Islamic groups in the country are as follows: -
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First, the maintenance of the political status quo so that no qualitative change in Pakistan’s structure of governance takes place. The religious right in Pakistan has been traditionally status quo oriented and during the days of a United Pakistan also, it supported the military’s crackdown on Bengali nationalist elements in the eastern wing because it supported a strong central authority. Since 1971 also, the religious right has taken a position against Sindhi, Mohajir, Pashtun and Baloch nationalism and has termed these nationalist forces contrary to the spirit of Islamic ideology. The ruling elites of Pakistan have also been traditionally anti-nationalist not because of the religious factor, but because they favored a strong center so as to sustain, what critics point out, the domination of Punjab over smaller provinces Only recently, following the military operation in the tribal areas of Pakistan, called the Wana Operation, the MMA has taken an anti-establishment position while threatening a strong backlash in the shape of Pashtun nationalism. The MMA is using both the religious and the nationalist card against Islamabad’s hunt for the Al-Qaeda elements supposedly hiding in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. Even then, MMA, which has a traditional alliance with the military establishment, has not taken a very hard line position on the Wana Operation. Its government in NWFP has also not openly confronted with Islamabad on the Wana operation but is contended with launching a mild criticism. Therefore, it is not wrong to argue that, despite some friction following the events of September 11 and the U-turn taken by the Pakistani establishment on the Taliban issue, the religious right has not broken its alliance with Islamabad because both know very well that the outcome of their schism would only help secular and democratic forces in the country. |
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Second, the induction of hard-line religious elements in the Pakistani establishment, particularly in the military during the days of Zia-ul-Haq further strengthened alliance between the real wielders of power and their religious allies. Although, the regime of President General Musharraf has tried to depict a secular picture but the reality is that the religious extremist groups are able to prevent him from undoing some controversial laws which were introduced during the process of Zia’s ‘Islamisation’. The Hudood Ordinance which is heavily criticized by secular elements as anti-women and anti-democratic has not been repealed because of the influence held by the extremist Islamic groups not only in the politics but also in the establishment of Pakistan. The secular elements in the power circles of Pakistan tend to reluctantly bear the nuisance value of hardline religious groups as a lesser evil because for them the real threat to their interest emanates from the forces who strive for social and political change in the society. For the ruling elites of Pakistan, the threat of ‘Islamic peril’ exists only on paper because those who raise the slogan of the Islamic revolution possess neither the will nor the capability in this regard. The power circles in Pakistan have also exploited the sectarian divide commonly known as the Shia-Sunni cleavage inorder to use religious parties for their interests. The penetration of intelligence agencies in the rank and file of religious groups and parties also helped the ruling establishment keep the so-called Islamic threat under control. |
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Third, the role of media, particularly the vernacular press has been significant in consolidating the linkage between the modern elite, the clergy and the Islamic movements of Pakistan. The state-centric view of security, democracy and issues pertaining to foreign policy, particularly on Kashmir is projected by a section of the print and electronic media in such a manner that the interests of religious groups and the establishment are protected. Right-wing journalists and commentators are the traditional and natural allies of Islamabad’s policy on India, democracy, nuclear issue and various political matters. A particular point of view which promotes state authority, commitment to Islamic ideology and anti-India rhetoric is shared by the right-wing and hawkish journalists and the establishment with the objective to prevent secular, democratic and nationalistic forces from gaining strength. The vernacular press, which is read by the overwhelming majority of people of Pakistan, has no space for discussion on issues which are faced by the country like poverty, the plight of women and minorities, cut in defense expenditures, exploitation on the basis of race and place of origin. But that segment of press is very much vocal on issues like putting restrictions on women, supporting discrimination against minorities, criticizing the demand for provincial autonomy, the misuse of religion for political purposes and hostility with India. The state-centric media approach is thus based on an understanding between the ruling establishment and the religious groups justifying their linkage based on the interests. |
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Fourth, on the issue of Kashmir and relations with India, one can see a traditional alliance between the modern elite, the clergy and the Islamic movements. The modern elite, which considers the Kashmir issue central to its policy objectives, finds religious groups its close ally. Both share an insecurity, paranoia and mistrust of India and both want Kashmir to be part of Pakistan by all means. The ruling establishment has used religious groups, including the Jihadi forces for exerting pressure on New Delhi to leave control over Kashmir but such a strategy has proved to be counter-productive because of India’s retaliatory measures as evident in the 1948 Indo-Pak war, 1965 Indo-Pak war, the Kargil war of 1999 and the events of 2001 and 2002. On the question of supporting the Taliban regime also, there was a nexus between the establishment of Pakistan and the religious groups as both wanted Kabul’s support for Islamabad’s Kashmir policy.
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The question is, will the linkage between the ruling elites and the religious groups sustain or will it break with the passage of time. As things stand in Pakistan today, excluding some hardline religious elements who are angry because of Islamabad’s support to America’s war on terrorism, the mainstream religious society has neither the will nor the interest or the capability to confront the establishment. Historically and traditionally, both have served each other’s interests and both realize that they are natural allies. Unlike Iran, where the clergy took an anti-establishment position during the days of the Shah, in Pakistan the religious groups and parties have acted as a B-team or proxy of the people at the helm of affairs. Based on these facts, there is little likelihood of a final split in the alliance of the ruling establishment and the clergy. Both need each other.
Sharing of Interests
It is no secret that the modern elite of Pakistan is status quo oriented and has nothing to do with the cause of bringing qualitative change in the socio-economic and political affairs of the country. An elite tends to be modern but deep down it is conservative in its thinking and approach. It shares its interests with the religious right on the issues of democracy, relations with India and the nuclear issue. How has the modern elite dealt with the contradictions in its alliance with the clergy and why has the clergy, which tends to be orthodox and retrogressive in its approach, supported the modern elite? It is a paradoxical situation but the necessity of interests has led to a relationship which is mutually beneficial for both of them.
Some of the contradictions in modern elite and the clergy, including various Islamic groups of Pakistan are as follows: -
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The modern elite views the West as its ally and supports American role in Pakistan, whether it is political, economic, cultural or security. The clergy, since the end of the cold war has followed an anti-West and anti-American stance. It is vehemently against following the U.S. position on terrorism and Kashmir. It seems that the modern elite has tried to make its position clear before religious groups that because of the changed circumstances following the events of September 11, it was not in a position to follow a policy contrary to America’s war on terrorism. Despite the contradiction in the position taken by the ruling elites of Pakistan and the religious groups on supporting the U.S. policy in Afghanistan, the alliance between the two is still in tact. |
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The modern elite under Musharraf expresses its support for a moderate Islamic system in which women are assured equal rights and their participation in the country’s progress and development is encouraged. Whereas, the religious groups and parties want to restrict the role of women in society. President Musharraf’s concept of ‘Enlightened moderation’ is in direct conflict with the clergy’s enforcement of Islam in its strictest sense. But, the ruling establishment doesn’t mind such a wide cleavage between its stance on religion and the clergy’s assertion to establish a pure Muslim state because if religious groups are highly offended then the advantage will be taken by Musharraf’s opponents. Therefore, democracy and a secular order remain an anathema to the clergy and it wouldn’t mind joining hands with the military and the bureaucracy provided the latter gives a free hand in preaching their brand of Islam. In fact, the clergy has never supported democratic movements because some segments within its fold indicated a contradiction between the Islamic system and democracy. To them, in democracy, the source of power is people and in that setup the political process is run by the people. According to them, the real source of power is ‘Allah’ and human beings don’t count in this regard. Till the time the ruling elite felt comfortable with the clergy, it followed the policy of using it against democracy and foreign policy adventures. But when it realized that the extremist elements in the clergy, who were once the favorites of the establishment, were involved in assassination attempts against President General Musharraf, the Core Commander, Karachi and the Federal Information Minister, the break with such Islamic groups was clear. Scores of Jihadi elements have been arrested in connection with these assassination attempts. |
In the formative phase of Musharraf’s rule, the military-clergy alliance remained intact and he saw no reason to break that alliance because, ‘the military would continue to use extremist forces but extremism was merely a tactical and strategic tool akin to a weapon’s system. It didn’t provide the military with ideological legitimacy. Musharraf therefore saw no contradiction between a secular military cultivating and using Islamic militancy. The event of September 11 had a momentous impact on Pakistan. General Musharraf and the military decided to support the U.S. war against the Taliban and also the hunt for Al-Qaeda in the Afghanistan-Pakistan corridor’. After the events of September 11, 2001, the contradictions which tend to further weaken the nexus between the ruling establishment and the clergy point out two important realities. First, the assassination attempts which were made by the militant Islamic groups on the life of President General Pervez Musharraf in December last year prove the fact that extremist religious elements who were earlier patronized by the military no longer enjoy the support of the men in khaki. The attack on the Chief of Army Staff indicates that the possibility of bridging contradictions between the military and the extremist religious groups is quite remote. Therefore, it has been argued that,
‘As the national interests of the military establishment and those of the Islamists are no longer fully compatible with each other, General Musharraf and his Jihadi opponents are clearly on a collision course. Investigation into the twin suicide attacks on Musharraf in Rawalpindi has established the involvement of ‘Brigade 313’, a closely knitted alliance of five Jihadi outfits, launched in 2001 to avenge the US attacks on Afghanistan. The five Brigade components include Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Harkat al-Jihad, al-Islami and the Harkatul Mujahideen al-Almi.’
Second, the question of restoring the alliance between the two has become more difficult because of American pressure to weed out Jihadi elements from the ruling establishment and minimize their role and influence in national politics.
Conclusion
The question that why democratic forces in Pakistan have not been able to deal with the nexus of the military and the clergy needs to be examined in the light of two major realities. First, structural weaknesses within political parties which expose their inability to launch a viable democratic struggle against military rule, religious and ethnic fanaticism. The division within various political parties and the lack of proper leadership also encourage non-political forces to deprive the people of Pakistan of democracy. Second, the economic sense of deprivation present in the vast majority of people of Pakistan provides a fertile ground to various extremist religious groups to exploit the situation and build a cadre of young people who are illiterate and unemployed. Neither political parties with progressive and liberal outlook nor the so-called educated class has been able to prevent hundreds of thousands of dissatisfied youth from falling into the hands of mullahs and becoming potential fanatics and terrorists. They also failed to counter the argument raised by the MMA that they can provide an alternate leadership and rid the country of corruption and misgovernance. The two mainstream political parties, Pakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians (PPPP) and Pakistan Muslim League (N) provided a fertile ground to religious parties seek better results in the October 2002 elections because their top leadership was implicated in corruption charges. The military establishment thought it easier to deal with the mullah element than with the leadership of mainstream political parties because these were considered a real threat to their power and privileges.
The future of the alliance between the ruling elites of Pakistan composed of the military, the bureaucracy, feudal, business and political depends on how the religious extremist elements are marginalized and how far the U.S. war on terrorism continues in Afghanistan. Based on the above facts and analyses, there are some obvious question marks as far as Pakistan’s future political order is concerned. First, will the military in Pakistan after Musharraf ‘s disappearance from the country’s political scene maintain a secular posture? Second, how will the clergy react to its possible marginalization in Pakistan’s politics once Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz is able to consolidate his grip over power. Like the assassination attempts on President Musharraf, Shaukat Aziz was also targeted by the hardline religious elements. Does it mean that the ruling establishment, which now claims to have a secular and modern approach, will finally end its decades-old alliance with the clergy? In that case, what will be the position of Islamabad on the policy of Jihad against the Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir?
The future of the alliance composed of the ruling elites of Pakistan is uncertain because of two reasons. First, the possibility of fragmentation in the rank and file of the clergy along moderate and extremist lines. The ruling establishment of Pakistan, after using the extremist segment of the clergy wants to keep a distance from that element and will surely promote moderate Islamic groups who will support Islamabad’s equation with Washington particularly on the war against terrorism and support curbs on sectarian and hardline religious activities. Second, the deepening of contradictions within the ruling elites of Pakistan particularly on the issues of democracy, the secular mode of governance, Kashmir and relations with India will determine the intactness and role of groups who have been ruling the country since its inception.
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