‘Youth’ is often associated with ‘anti-systemic attitudes’, ‘radicalism’ and ‘non-conformity’, being caught in a state between adjustment and rebellion. Any youth protest or unrest is then easily perceived as a generational problem that demands specific support for youth in their transition (e.g. through social workers, educational programs) rather than calling attention to prevailing societal problems that would require socio-political reforms:

"In this view the youth question is by definition diversionary, deflecting public attention and resources away from what can and should be changed (political and economic conditions) and towards something that is essentially unchangeable (adolescent behaviour)."¹³

Such negative societal images towards young people lead to serious dangers of increasing a sense of alienation among youth, who see themselves as not needed or respected but rather stigmatised through negative stereotypes. In case of prolonged transitionary periods from youth to adulthood, such experiences can lead to increased frustration and anger as some of the qualitative interviews from the National Youth Survey 2000, Sri Lanka reveal:

"The ideas of youth are not much taken notice of. Youth are viewed as rebellious trouble-makers. It is because parents, teachers and politicians stay away from their duties that the capabilities of youth cannot be realized. (...) Young people are a group who wants to live independently and achieve a permanent status in life. But in today's context these are mere fantasies. Young people are frustrated and their hopes are shattered, so they want to achieve things through good or bad means."¹⁴

It is clear from the above, that the prolonged inability to ‘achieve a permanent status in life’ and become independent puts more pressure on the process of identity formation of young people in Sri Lanka.¹⁵ In addition, the high number of unemployed or job-seeking youth, out of whom a majority spend most of their time at home in Sri Lanka, exposed to images and lifestyles through electronic media might further increase their feeling of being alienated from available opportunities in society.¹⁶

2. Attitudes of Sri Lanka Youth Towards Democracy

As in policy formulation, young people have also not received much attention in research in Sri Lanka. Most studies would rather focus on children and educational issues at large, rather than the specific situation of adolescents and their transition period towards adulthood. Even less attention has been paid to the attitudes and opinion of young people towards democracy. Despite the increased discourse on inviting youth to be partners in sustainable development, this has only translated (by and large) into ideas of involving youth to support community based development planning and implementation. There are hardly any real empowerment attempts in terms of more political power sharing or involvement in critical civil society organizations.

This is even more striking in view of the fact that the major violent conflicts in Sri Lanka in the North-East as well as in the South have been and are led by youth. Additionally there has been an increase in criminal violence among young people over the last years as well, which receives mainly attention in newspaper reports and public discourse. However, this “problematizing” of youth in Sri Lanka has not led to any coherent attempts to better understand youth behaviour, especially those of anti-systemic nature. Attitudes and opinion towards the democratic system in Sri Lanka could be one important indicator to gain more insight into young people's attitudes. Addressing these would be paramount for social and political stability of the country.

2.1. Patterns of Democratic Attitudes

Some indications of young people’s opinions about democratic processes and institutions can be sought through the ‘re-analysis’ of some of the data collected under the National Youth Survey¹⁷ 1999/ 2000 in Sri Lanka, which covered a number of questions with relevance to the issue of democracy. The national multi-stage stratified random sample of respondents included 2892 young people throughout the country (including the conflict affected Northern and Eastern parts of Sri Lanka). The survey covered youth aged 15-29 years and unmarried. For the purpose of this article, three sub-samples have been formed among the respondents of the National Youth Survey in order to identify groups of youth with strong opinions or attitudes in areas relevant to the question of democracy in Sri Lanka. The following sections use data arising from cross-tabulations from these sub-samples to underline some of the arguments made by the authors.

Firstly, youth who answered the question “How much interest would you say you have in politics and public affairs?” as well as “Did you vote in the last election?” in the negative, have been put together in a sample of “youth with no interest in politics”.

Looking at the profile arising from the above sample, drawn from youth in the year 1999/2000, democracy’s future in Sri Lanka doesn’t look very promising. 52.5% of the youth stated that they have no interest in politics. Out of the young men 44.3% expressed their disinterest in politics, whereas out of the female youth this percentages goes up to 66.8%, indicating an alarmingly lesser degree of interest in politics among young women in Sri Lanka. Looking at the ethnic profile, out of the Sinhalese youth population 46.1% have no interest in politics, whereas within the Tamil youth it is a large number of 77.4 % of youth with no interest. Interestingly, the number of youth disinterested in politics is lowest within the Muslim youth constituency, with only 5.9% stating their disinterest. It is also noteworthy that 86% of youth with no interest in politics have no high opinion of present political leaders.

There is no particular pattern in regard to educational background of youth in regard to their interest in politics. However, when looking at the group of youth which is not interested in politics at all, the number is highest for those youth between the age of 15-19 (83.3%) as compared to 49.6% of the youth aged 20-24 and only 35.1% of the youth aged 25-29. For the youngest age group that can be certainly also linked to their non-eligibility to participate in elections.

However, it should be of concern that especially the adolescent youth, which could actually experience their first democratic experiences, show such higher disinterest in politics than their older counterparts. It is also noteworthy that a higher percentage of women (more than 20%) remain disinterested in politics within the older age segments than their male counterparts. Hence, attempts to increase the participation of young first-time voters in political processes would need to be particularly gender-sensitive.

Another pattern of concern is that 86.7% of youth between the age of 15-19 who do not have any interest in politics feel that violence is an acceptable means to fulfil one’s interest. This percentage again goes down significantly in the transition towards older youth (51% for the 20-24 year old and 31.8% for the 25-29 year old). In respect of this, youth integration into democratic structures and promotion of youth internalisation of democratic principles would need to be considered or promoted at a relatively young age.

Secondly, youth who answered the questions “How much in your opinion do political parties in Sri Lanka help to make government pay attention to the people?” and “Do you think your vote has any effect on how things are run in this country?” in the positive, form a sample of “youth who perceive political parties as ineffective”, which can be seen as a lack of confidence in one of the core elements of the democratic system in Sri Lanka.

More than half of the youth in this sub-sample, 56.7% think that political parties are NOT effective. There is no significant gender difference in this perception, but there are differences between the different ethnic communities: 49.5 % within the Sinhalese, 59.4% within Muslim, and 85.4 % within Tamil community describe the work of political parties in Sri Lanka as inefficient. Interestingly, despite the higher interest of Muslim youth in politics as such, their perspectives regarding efficiency of parties elected appears to be significantly lower.

There are no significant differences in regard to the educational level of youth in answering these questions. However, when looking at the transition of youth during the age period 20 –24 towards the age period 25 - 29, young people in the urban sector experience a much sharper decline (of 15.4%) in their belief into an effective political system than rural youth (of only 0.5%). It seems that youth living in urban areas are much more disillusioned than their rural counterparts.

Looking at the transition of adolescent youth (20-24) to adult youth (25-29), it is also noteworthy that especially Muslim youth show a very sharp decline in their belief into an effective political system (of 16.7%) as opposed to Sinhalese and Tamil youth who show no significant changes. This might point towards a much higher degree of alienation and lack of perceived support by the political establishment of adult Muslim youth. In combination with patterns that male Muslim youth face the biggest hurdles in their school-to-work transition,¹⁸ this should be seen as an urgent indicator to address the political integration of Muslim youth more strongly.

Finally, the following questions were combined to describe a sample of “youth with negative attitudes towards democratic principle”: 'Suppose there were no parties and elections were not held, do you think the government in this country would run better?”, “Do you agree or disagree: what this country needs more than all the laws and talk is a few determined and strong leaders”, and “Do you agree or disagree: it is not desirable to have political parties struggling with each other for power”.

Here the emerging picture appears even more pessimistic in terms of the involvement and experiences of young people with democracy in Sri Lanka. The vast majority of 89.2% of youth have a negative attitude towards democratic structures. Slightly more than half of them (55.1%) have no trust at all in political parties (as against only 27.4% of those youth with positive attitudes towards democracy).

There are no significant gender differences appearing in this picture, but the younger age group (15-19) shows again the highest percentage of distrust in democracy (96.7%) as against 71.4% within the age group of 20-24 and 63.6 % within the age group of 25-29. This raises serious questions about the educational system in Sri Lanka and its ability to introduce democratic values and principles to the students.

Looking into further characteristics of those youth with negative attitudes towards democracy, they appear to be rather pessimistic regarding the country’s situation (64.2% think that the situation is bad), they lack role models (78.3%) and 39.8% believe that use of violence is proper to fulfil one’s interests.

What could be a point of concern is the pattern that nearly half of the youth with negative attitudes towards democracy expressed a great deal of trust in military (as opposed to only 27.4% of those youth with positive attitudes towards democracy). This is in line with their desire for strong, authoritarian leaders rather than having different parties struggling for power, but it can also be seen as an indicator that those youth frustrated by the political system do not seek reforms through political grass-root level empowerment, but rather ‘stronger’ hands at the central government.

2.2. Youth Attitudes as Indicator for Societal Conditions

As there is no empirical data available that would allow inter-generational comparison of democratic attitudes in Sri Lanka, the above analysis necessarily has to focus on young people alone (with the exception of certain transitional periods during the process of youth-hood). However, the National Youth Survey also revealed, that young people in Sri Lanka define themselves mainly along regional and community-related lines and to a much lesser extent in terms of their age. The authors therefore would support the assumption that youth behaviour in Sri Lanka, and especially radical behaviour, is not necessarily linked to a particular biological stage in their life cycle (such as age), but to a greater degree to their need to define their position within society as well as the lesser social responsibilities that they may face). The latter two factors possibly enable young people to get involved much more readily in possibly violent anti-systemic protest movements against prevailing injustice and denied opportunities. In other words, youth may react more strongly towards social and political issues, if they feel frustrated by the process. This could mean that youth behaviour is a good indicator for the overall situation of a particular society.

In this context, the distrust and disillusionment in political parties and the negative attitudes towards democracy of youth described in the section above can be attributed not only as an important indicator of problematic governance but must also be understood in the context of the historical practice of democracy in Sri Lanka. The following section advances some ideas that may prove useful in understanding the particular relationship between youth and democracy, thus highlighting general failures of the democratic process in Sri Lanka and the inherent dangers of this situation, especially in regard to the social integration of Sri Lankan youth into society in a peaceful and productive manner.

2.3. Political Patronage/ Clientage: Historical Dimensions

At independence in 1948, Ceylon inherited a political system that was fashioned on the Westminster model of the British colonial power, which claimed to separate legislation and policy making (the domain of parliament) from that of policy implementation (the domain of an apolitical administrative service).¹⁹ After the populist victory of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party in 1956, the separation of powers between these two branches of government was seriously undermined. Allegations of elitism in the administrative service were used to justify the politicisation of the bureaucracy and administration, with parliamentarians (especially those in government) increasingly wielding power over access and distribution of state resources.²⁰

As both Stirrat and Obeyesekere²¹ have observed, this development of MP’s patronal powers did not take place, ‘in a social or cultural vacuum’.²² Rather, since the Westminster model had been imposed on a pre-existing traditional feudal bureaucracy, what had emerged was a hybrid of the two, ‘in which neither the rules of the old order nor the new are truly operative’.²³ Indeed, the models of status, prestige and community being used in this context often resonated with pre-colonial political and cosmological concepts such as pirisa (following or retinue), with similar expectations of patronage in return for loyalty.²⁴

The role of political parties, in the post-independence era, appears to follow this model closely, with strong popular expectations (often fulfilled in part or full) that loyal supporters would be rewarded with benefits of government jobs, access to services such as electricity or development projects, and other individual favours. The rapid turn-over of political parties elected into government in the three decades following independence helped foster a heightened sensitivity of politicians and parties to the ‘needs and demands’ of their particular constituencies.²⁵

2.4. ‘Bypassing’: The Use of Social Capital in Facilitating Everyday Life

With the disruption of predictable systems for the distribution of political power and authority in a post-colonial era of rapid social change, material uncertainty and physical insecurity, it seems that people living in Sri Lanka have increasingly cultivated patrons to protect and further their interests. This is sometimes popularly represented as a dyadic relationship between an ‘everyman’ and a member of parliament, a senior government administrator or major industrialist, which ‘bypasses’ the bureaucracy of the formal mechanisms for the purposes of obtaining employment, development assistance, benefits or services in return for votes, loyalty or other services.

However, more often than not, the relationship between client and patron is mediated and facilitated by intermediary social connections and institutions. There is, of course, no such person as an everyman. Persons who are successful in establishing patron-client relationships are able to do so because of socio-political capital that has been acquired through a variety of means and by virtue of their specific social locations. In many parts of Sri Lanka, the obvious and most effective means of cultivating patronage/clientage – regardless one’s social origins – is through involvement with a major political party, because the state is the premier ‘permanent’ employer and provider of key services and benefits.

The National Youth Survey confirms this pattern also for the younger generation. Among those youth with interest in politics, half of them (51.6%) have contacted a political leader (as compared to only 16.2% of those who have no interest in politics). The reasons for contacting, however, are predominantly related to individual affairs: 64.5 % contacted a politician for employment or other personal reason, and only 30.6 % for public matters or community affairs.

These links between politics and personal benefits is also confirmed by various statements from the qualitative interviews of the National Youth Survey:

“Here youth are supporting politicians. After that they demand jobs. Only those who work for politicians find employment. Otherwise even with education they have to just wait. This happens because most of the jobs are under manipulation of the government.”²⁶

“Politics is unfair on young people. Politicians associate young people only for personal gains. Politicians give jobs to people they like.”²⁷

However, the phenomenon of patronage/clientage is not limited only to the realm of parliamentary or local government politics. Even a cursory examination of access to health care, social welfare payments, vehicle registration, employment or school admission will reveal common practices of ‘bypassing’ the regular administrative and bureaucratic process, whether in the state or private sector.

These practices are facilitated through complex networks of social relationships that might hinge on elements such as kinship, shared geographical origins, shared associates, ethnicity, political affiliation, chance acquaintance or deep friendship, class, caste, past or potential patron-client relationships and of course exchanges in cash or kind.

Effective social actors often self-consciously invest a great deal of energy and resources in establishing and maintaining relationships that represent socio-political capital which can be mobilised at times of need. The accumulation of social capital is viewed as providing individuals (and groups) with a comparative advantage or ‘edge’ in contexts where access to resources or services is competitive or arduous.

The above picture is confirmed when looking at the data of a recent survey investigating the ‘School-to-Work-Transition’²⁸ of youth between the ages of 15-24. Approximately half of all youth (54 %) were trying to find jobs through friends and relatives, with sharp decline to all other categories mentioned in the survey (such as advertisements, employment agencies, educational or training institute services etc.).

Although ‘political contacts’ were barely mentioned as a source to find employment, the importance of social contacts through family and relatives may include linkages to political stakeholders but more importantly demonstrate the significance of social capital in this set-up. Young people themselves might not be in the position to directly draw on political contacts. However, their adult family members (or those of their friends) might rather be in a position to do so. In any case these contacts, whether political or private nature, appear to be the foremost important asset for youth in order to find a job.²⁹

As Uyangoda³⁰ points out, Sri Lankan youth of today follow on from, “a generation born into and raised under conditions of the welfare state, [whose] socialization process in the 70’s and 80’s was fundamentally shaped in the general belief that the state was a dependable source of social support and therefore state dependency a social right”. Such expectations are still very much in evidence, with the actions of politicians and political parties reinforcing the idea that association with them would facilitate access to state support to ‘meet the needs of youth’.

This is further confirmed by another study looking into human rights awareness in rural Sri Lanka, focusing on the way in which individuals conceptualise human rights.³¹ Apart from nearly one-third of the respondents not having a concrete idea about human rights, most respondents would see rights within the context of their own individual or personal entitlement and less as collective or common rights.³² Among young people below the age of 30 and with higher educational achievements, it appears that the concept of human rights revolves even more specifically around issues of access to appropriate employment opportunities.³³

As indicated in the above section, there is a strong perception that youth who are a part of a politician’s retinue – or at the very least have provided support at the previous elections – stand a better chance of obtaining employment within the government service, whilst others with greater merit are overlooked. The role that politicians play in providing access to employment is underlined by the fact that around 50% of all respondents to the National Youth Survey had contacted a local political leader to obtain assistance with personal needs such as access to employment.

Despite being critical of political manipulation, where there is not enough to go around (in terms of available jobs or social welfare benefits), youth may perceive that there may be little advantage to be gained from an equitable distribution of resources. Whilst there is popular discontent about the bypassing or subverting of formal structures and procedures through political patronage/ clientage or other social relationships, it is clear that those condemning such practices often engage in the very same activities themselves and it appears that youth are no exception from this pattern.

However, it is important to note that the fear of unemployment or not being able to secure an appropriate livelihood, is the foremost important issue young people between the age 15-24 age concerned with in Sri Lanka nowadays, with around 80% of the youth giving this statement in a more recent survey, followed by other societal problems such as alcohol and drug problems within their families, poverty, high costs of living, war etc.³⁴

Even more noteworthy is the fact that 72.9% of all schooling youth in Sri Lanka perceive it as ‘difficult’ or even as ‘very difficult’ to find a decent job.³⁵ This clearly shows that the main social problem of today’s globalized world has reached even young people who have not yet begun to look for jobs themselves. This explains on the one hand the pressure on formal educational achievements, seen as the most important means to secure a decent job,³⁶ and the resulting pressure on young people to fulfil the expectations of often economically disadvantaged parents who have invested in the education of their children. On the other hand, it also limits the space and ability of young people to get involved in social or politically oriented activities that could strengthen local civil society structures.

2.5. Youth Experiences of Democracy and Governance

Contemporary youth in Sri Lanka clearly lack trust in political parties and government. These feelings possibly relate to the popular critical discourses about patronage/ clientage as well as to their first-hand experiences of disillusionment in relation to their expectations of the state. Looking at the National Youth Survey data, the trust in democratic institutions is extremely limited: nearly half of the youth (47%) express ‘no trust at all’ in parties and as well as the elected representatives. These number are even higher among those youth who perceive political parties as ineffective: 97.3% have limited or no trust in political parties, 94.8% no or limited trust in elected representatives and 90.3% limited or no trust in government officials.

Whilst some youth appear to have strong ideas about how the system should function ideally, their understanding (or perception) of how it does function in reality has undermined their trust in democratic institutions; in the body of elected representatives or the corps of selected government administrators. The particular working model of democracy that contemporary youth, and indeed their parental generation, have experienced in Sri Lanka clearly shapes their understanding of the potential of democracy to deliver equitable and effective services to all. The following statement of a youth from the National Youth Survey can be seen as symptomatic to understand this particular perception of the Sri Lankan political system by the younger generation:

“If one can call the ruling party a caste, possibly a caste is benefiting more from the country's development activities. Resources are divided up according to the political party that is in power. When a successive government takes over, immediately the workers in the opposition loose their jobs and the ruling party supporters replace them.”³⁷

In the context of a state that is increasingly unable to support or fulfil their expectations or aspirations, youth attitudes towards engaging with democratic processes and structures appear largely ambivalent. Even those who have strong positive attitudes towards democracy express a great deal of distrust in government, elected representatives, officials or political parties.

The view that the function of state institutions is essentially biased by partisan favouritism and highly particular patron-client relationships provides additional impetus and legitimisation for seeking to accumulate and use one’s own socio-political capital to ‘correct’ for possible disadvantage. However, for youth, their ability to accumulate such capital will be circumscribed by their own social locations (i.e. class, gender, ethnicity) and by the interest of local political actors to cultivate their clientage.

The particular ways in which youth might engage with the existing democratic institutions and processes in Sri Lanka are likely to be shaped by these factors. For example, the striking disparity between the levels of interest in politics between Tamil and Sinhala youth³⁸ could be explained by the fact Tamil youth are neither courted by the major Sinhala-dominated parties nor likely to gain any significant benefits from the patronage of Tamil political parties that wield limited control over resources due to the far greater influence of the militant Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) within their constituencies.

Whilst the patronal potential of Tamil political parties is restricted by the fact that real power is located outside their domain, political parties catering to a similar minority constituency of Muslims are able to cultivate clientage very effectively, with the effect that only 5.9% of Muslim youth surveyed claimed no interest in politics.

The question of why youth may specifically experience a lack of trust or interest in Sri Lankan democratic political processes or structures might also be answered in part by a consideration of their access to the socio-political capital that enables people to ‘work’ the political and administrative system in Sri Lanka. As a category, ‘youth’ may be understood as constituting a liminal social identity – an in-between stage between childhood and adulthood – which appeared in Sri Lanka as a result of social changes in the 19th century .³⁹

Popular contemporary notions about youth, as discussed earlier in this chapter, are indicative of the problematic nature of this social identity – which is characterised as having an awkward and often-antagonistic relationship to the ‘adult’ social world. The marginal or estranged position of youth identities makes it a difficult location from which to develop the social relationships that accrue socio-political capital for use in everyday life. For young women, the particular restrictions they face in negotiating patriarchal public political spaces and patron-client relationships can further limit their options with regards to developing their socio-political capital. It is unsurprising, therefore, that they are even more likely to lack an interest in politics than their male counterparts.

Whilst sponsorship into adult networks where power, influence and resources circulate is easier for youth who grow up within families with such connections, for many others these only become possible with the transition into employment – especially within the government sector. Given the perception of inequity in relation to opportunities for employment, it is not surprising that youth lacking the necessary political patronage for sponsorship into work look with expectation to authority figures that might overrule the systems of patronage/clientage from which they are excluded.

3. Youth and the Future of Democracy in Sri Lanka

If practices of patronage/clientage and ‘bypassing’ of formal structures and processes are in fact central to the everyday life transactions and political activity for people in Sri Lanka , the reasons that these are problematic to young people may be largely because they, as a general class of person, are excluded from the adult social networks through which one can ‘get things done’ (i.e. secure employment or access social services). Youth identity and social location have direct implications for the ability of youth to accumulate the socio-political capital to get important things done. Whilst youth critiques of the existing practices of governance based on patronage/clientage derive from a frustration with their exclusion from these adult networks, they do not necessarily mean that youth represent a force for change and strengthened democracy. Once removed from their positions of marginality, either by attainment of full social ‘adulthood’ or through other means, the impetus for social reform may indeed decline for young adults.

Youth engagement with politics in Sri Lanka’s recent history has been most conspicuously seen within the secessionist war in the North and East of Sri Lanka as well as in the attempted insurrections that affected the rest of the island. Despite obviously different dynamics being present in each case, in all these instances, the impetus for these movements derived from marginalised youth who were estranged from the parliamentary and administrative systems of the country. However, these popular movements – when they obtain a degree of local political power, such as in the case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam or Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna – have largely failed to institute regimes that dismantle the patronage/clientage practices that they have violently and publicly opposed, but rather have permitted the same mechanisms to favour their own members or constituencies. This may perhaps provide a caution that the successful political mobilisation of marginalised youth in response to bad governance does not necessarily engender a shift towards greater democracy.

It is essential to recognise that the relationship between youth and democracy in Sri Lanka must be considered in the broader context of the socio-historical development and practice of democracy nationally (and locally) as well as of social relations between different ‘classes’ of individuals within the Sri Lankan polity. Failure to do so could result in seriously misunderstanding the complex society-wide dynamics at work in shaping the attitudes and behaviour of youth in relation to macro and micro-levels of governance. In the context of Sri Lanka, where great hope is often (naïvely) invested in the potential for young people alone to be the agents of change for ‘greater social harmony’ and better governance, such a broader analysis may be a valuable corrective.

Notes:

¹ Markus Mayer is the Senior Programme Coordinator of the Social Policy Analysis and Research Centre (SPARC) at the University of Colombo, Sri Lanka. He has a Ph.D in Development Geography with a focus on youth conflicts and regional development planning. He is co-editor of Sri Lanka at Crossroads: Dilemmas and Prospects After 50 Years of Independence (Macmillan 2000), Sri Lankan Youth: Challenges and Responses (FES 2002) and Building Local Capacities for Peace: Rethinking Conflict and Development in Sri Lanka (Macmillan 2003).
² Ananda Galappatti has a background in psychology and a Masters in Medical Anthropology. He has, for the last nine years, been involved in psychosocial work in the context of armed conflict in Sri Lanka. Ananda Galappatti is currently Advisor and Coordinator of The Mangrove, a network for post tsunami psychosocial work in the Batticaloa district of Eastern Sri Lanka. He is also an editor of Intervention: the International Journal of Mental Health, Psychosocial Work and Counselling in Areas of Armed Conflict.
* The authors are grateful to Nishara Fernando, Department of Sociology, University of Colombo, for his support in the re-analysis of the National Youth Survey data.
³ UN 2004, World Youth Report 2003
⁴ Lakshman, 2002
⁵ DC& S 2002
⁶ STWT 2004
⁷ Kemper 2005:8
⁸ Wyn/ Dwyer 1999:14
⁹ World Youth Report 2003:6
¹⁰ Cohen 1997:225
¹¹ Engberg-Pedersen/ Webster 2002:4
¹² Roche/ Tucker 1997:1
¹³ Cohen 1997:192
¹⁴ Thanamavilla, female, 24 yrs., 2nd year Univ. student. (NYS 2000)
¹⁵ Perera 2005
¹⁶ Hettige et al 2001, STWT 2004
¹⁷ The National Youth Survey has been a collaborative initiative between the University of Colombo and a variety of international organizations, such as the South Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg, the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (FES), the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and the German Cultural Institute in Colombo, Sri Lanka. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) funded the main survey. The research covered the opinions and attitudes of Sri Lankan youth on a whole range of issues, not only in the field of politics, but more so on socio-cultural and developmental aspects that are of importance for young people.
¹⁸ STWT 2004
¹⁹ Stirrat, 1992: 170-171
²⁰ Ibid: 171
²¹ Obeyesekere 1977
²² Ibid
²³ Ibid: 388
²⁴ Stirrat, 1992: 171-172
²⁵ Bjorkman, 1985: 548; Kearney, 1975: 29
²⁶ Welligama youth, female, 20 yrs, O/L educated/ NYS 2000
²⁷ Thanamavilla youth, male, 21 yrs, Gr. 7 educated/ NYS 2000
²⁸ STWT 2004
²⁹ Ibid: 69
³⁰ Uyangoda 1995: 13
³¹ De Silva 2004
³² Ibid: 227
³³ Ibid: 229
³⁴ STWT 2004:18
³⁵ Ibid:60
³⁶ Ibid:xx
³⁷ Hambantota youth, male, 18 yrs, O/L educated/ NYS 2000
³⁸ 77.6% and 46.1% respectively expressing no interest in politics in the National Youth Survey 2000
³⁹ Caldwell et al, 1998: 144

REFERENCES

Bjorkman (1985) ‘Health & Politics in Sri Lanka: Developments in the South Asian Welfare State’, Asian Survey, Vol. 25 (5): 537-552.

Caldwell, John C./ Pat Caldwell/ Bruce K. Caldwell/ Indrani Peiris (1998) ‘The Construction of Adolescence in a Changing World: Implications for Sexuality, Reproduction and Marriage’, Studies in Family Planning, Vol. 29 (2): 137-153.

Cohen, P. (1997) Rethinking the Youth Question: Education, Labour and Cultural Studies. London.

D.C.& S. (2002) Statistical Abstract 2002, Colombo: Department of Census and Statistics.

De Silva, Sepalika (2004) ‘Conceptualising Human Rights: Implications for Development and Poverty Reduction Strategies’, in Asirwatham, R./ P. Thalaysingam (eds.), Poverty and Social Conflict in Sri Lanka, 4th Annual Symposium in Poverty Research in Sri Lanka, Colombo: CEPA & IMCAP.

Hettige, S.T./ M. Mayer/ M. Salih (2005) School-to-Work-Transition of Youth in Sri Lanka, Geneva: Employment Policies Unit, ILO.

Hettige, S.T./ Markus Mayer (2002) Sri Lankan Youth: Challenges and Responses, Colombo: FES.

Hettige, S.T./ Markus Mayer/ Ayoma Abeysuriya (2001) Globalization, Electronic Media and Cultural Change: The Case of Sri Lanka, Colombo: German Cultural Institute.

Kearney (1983) ‘The Party Political System in Sri Lanka’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 98 (1): 17-33.

Kemper, Y. (2005): ‘Youth in War-to-Peace Transitions: Approaches of International Organizations’, Berghof Report Nr. 10, Berlin: Berghof Center for Constructive Conlfict Management.

Lakshman, W. D. (2002) ‘A Holistic View of Youth Unemployment in Sri Lanka’, in Hettige, S.T./ Markus Mayer (2002) Sri Lankan Youth: Challenges and Responses, Colombo: FES, pp. 57-88.

Mayer, M. (2004) ‘Reinterpreting Ethnic Tensions in Sri Lanka: The Impact of Social Discrimination on Youth and Violent Conflict’, in Hussein, A. (2004), Race: Identity, Caste & Conflict in the South Asian Context, Papers presented at the World Conference Against Racism, Durban, South Africa, 31 August to 7 September 2001, pp. 76-129.

Mayer, M./ D. Rajasingham-Senanayake/ Y. Thangarajah (eds.) (2003) Building Local Capacities for Peace: Rethinking Conflict and Development in Sri Lanka, New Delhi: Macmillan India.

NYS (2000) Qualitative Case Studies Report: National Youth Survey Sri Lanka, South Asia Institute & University of Colombo.

Obeyesekere, G. (1977) ‘Social Change and the Deities: Rise of the Kataragama Cult in Modern Sri Lanka’, Man, New Series, Vol. 12, No. 3/4: 377-396.

Perera, S. (2005): ‘Youth – Addressing the Absences’. Unpublished Concept Paper for a Conference on Youth organized by the German Cultural Institute, Colombo.

Roche, J./ S. Tucker (1997) Youth in Society: Contemporary Theory, Policy and Practice. London.

Stirrat, R. L. (1992) Power and Religiosity in a Post-Colonial Setting: Sinhala Catholics in contemporary Sri Lanka, Cambridge University Press.

STWT (2004) Survey on School-to-Work-Transition in Sri Lanka. Final Revised Report, Colombo: ILO-IMCAP.

UN (2004): Youth and the Millennium Development Goals: Challenges and Opportunities for Implementation: Interim Report of the As Hoc Working Group for Youth and MDGs, November 2004.

Uyangoda, J. (1995) ‘Sri Lanka: Some Issues of Social Integration’, in Pravada, Vol. 4, No.3, pp. 11-14.

Webster, N./ L. Engberg-Pedersen (2002) In the Name of the Poor: Contesting Political Space for Poverty Reduction, London/ New York: Zed Books.

World Youth Report (2003) The Global Situation of Youth. New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations.

Wyn, J./ P. Dwyer (1999) ‘New Directions in Research on Youth in Transition’, in Journal of Youth Studies, 2 (1), pp. 5-21.